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Abstract 
This article regards exclusive conceptions of citizenship as the principal stumbling block to 
developing alternatives to repressive penal policies. Indeed, exclusive communities foster 
mistrust and suspicion of the Other, leading to punitive responses to ‘outsiders’. It is therefore 
argued that the very notion of citizenship needs to be ‘reimagined’ in such a way that it is 
genuinely inclusive and encourages shared responsibility, thus enabling us to go beyond 
exclusive communities and penal policies generative of irresponsibilities. The idea of an 
inclusive citizenship of the common, founded on justice and responsibility, is promoted as a 
real utopian vision. Transformative justice is put forward as one means of realising this 
vision by allowing citizens to collectively institute a genuinely new penal rationality.  
 
Introduction 
As has long been recognised, any attempts to develop alternatives to current penal 
practices are seriously hindered by the social distance created between offenders and a 
mythical law-abiding majority. The commonplace treatment of the majority of offenders 
as non-citizens precludes meaningful dialogue and debate with ‘the citizenry’. In recent 
years, debate about penal issues amongst those who are seen to be worthy of citizenship 
has often been reduced to base populism (Pratt, 2007). Consequently, if we wish to move 
beyond exclusionary responses to ‘crime’ and social harm, the very notion of citizenship 
needs to be ‘reimagined’ in such a way that it is genuinely pluralist and inclusive, 
incorporating all those affected by harmful behaviour, whether they are regarded as 
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victims or offenders. This will entail rejecting all forms of penal fatalism in favour of a ‘real 
utopian’ approach (Wright, 2009) which seeks to recreate citizenship based on the 
principle of mutual responsibility and social action within institutions of ‘the common’. 
Following Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval (2014), the ‘common’ is understood here as 
emancipatory praxis, as the shared activity through which people come together to 
develop alternatives to social problems, different from those proposed by either the State 
or private interests. It is a useful concept in that it is genuinely inclusive and encourages 
shared responsibility, thus enabling us to go beyond exclusive communities and penal 
policies generative of irresponsibilities. Rather than de-responsibilising citizens 
regarding their response to social harm, as occurs when criminal justice issues are 
captured by the State, a real utopian conception of citizenship, based on this idea of the 
common would allow individuals and communities to play an active role in finding 
solutions to shared problems. 
 This article begins by discussing how exclusive notions of citizenship are 
detrimental to the very existence of a moral community based on mutual responsibility. 
It then explores how citizenship may be reimagined following the logic of ‘considered 
utopianism’ (Bourdieu) to foster a genuinely ‘common’ approach to problems of social 
harm. Drawing on the work of radical social theorists such as Proudhon (2011) and 
Dardot and Laval (2014), it is argued that a ‘reimagined citizenship of the common’ should 
foster both justice and responsibility. It is a citizenship that goes beyond 
communitarianism which, while fostering responsibility, often fails to promote justice, 
focusing as it does on the level of community rather than of state institutions. It is 
recognised that practices of the common will not emerge naturally and spontaneously but 
must be instituted (Dardot & Laval, 227). The final part of the paper aims to demonstrate 
how constructing non-penal real utopias may both result from and help to institute a 
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reimagined citizenship of the common. Picking up on Enrique Dussel’s (2013), notion of 
‘liberation praxis’, it suggests that citizenship must not be merely inclusive but also 
transformative if it is to be truly just. Transformative justice is thus promoted as a means 
of instituting a genuinely new non-penal rationality through emancipatory praxis.  
 
Exclusive citizenship and irresponsibility 
Conditional citizenship 
As Reiner has pointed out, ‘the term “citizenship” is now more often used in political 
discussion in exclusive, nationalistic, and particularistic terms, focusing on barriers to the 
status of citizen, with the stress on hurdles, testing, pedigree, and desert’ (Reiner, 2010: 
244). This trend has largely coincided with the rise of neoliberalism with its emphasis on 
the need for individual citizens to become more ‘active’ in dealing with their own 
problems, rather than relying on the State. Consequently, citizenship has become 
increasingly conditional upon behaviour (Dwyer, 1998), upon individuals’ capacity to 
accept personal responsibility. Those who are seen to have flouted the rules of the game 
are excluded from the normal rights of citizenship, notably ‘social citizenship’ (Marshall, 
1950), as they find their social security benefits withdrawn. Access to political citizenship 
is also increasingly restricted: for foreign nationals, it is increasingly subject to formal 
testing and economic status - for example, citizens or settled foreign nationals wishing to 
sponsor their partner or spouse to join them in the United Kingdom must prove that they 
have a minimum gross annual income of £18,600. The civil rights of citizenship are also 
hard to enforce as individual freedoms are threatened by new surveillance technologies 
and strengthened police powers.  
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 Renewed focus on the responsibilities rather than the rights of citizens has been a 
useful way for neoliberal governments to scapegoat individuals for social problems whilst 
simultaneously justifying reductions in state spending. Yet, the focus on the individual 
over the State was much criticised, notably by New Labour seeking to build a ‘third way’ 
between the excessive individualism of the Thatcher years and the statism of the post-
war period, and by Cameron seeking to ‘detoxify’ the Conservative Party of its ‘nasty’ 
(May, 2002), uncaring image. For both, the active citizen was not to be regarded solely as 
an individual but as a member of a wider community. What Jean and John Comaroff 
describe as the ‘Second Coming of Civil Society’ was to be ‘the ultimate magic bullet in the 
Age of Millennial Capitalism’ (2001: 44), capable of providing the necessary social glue to 
hold together societies fragmented by the ravages of neoliberalism, whilst enabling 
successive politicians to rebrand their politics. For New Labour, civil society was to be 
boosted by communitarianism which would ensure that individuals assumed 
responsibility, not for their own ends, but in the best interests of the community as a 
whole. For Cameron’s conservatives, the ‘Big Society’ was to enable individuals to work 
together to create ‘communities with oomph – neighbourhoods who are in charge of their 
own destiny, who feel if they club together and get involved they can shape the world 
around them’ (Cameron, 2010a). In both cases, individuals and communities were to be 
liberated from the State and all of its coercive capacity. Yet, this vision ignored the 
coercive power of communities themselves.  
 
Coercive communities and deresponsibilisation 
For Barbara Hudson, communities can be extremely coercive, especially when they seek 
to enforce values, often imposing ‘a constriction of freedom of choice about how one lives’ 
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and grouping together to exclude those who fail to conform (Hudson, 2003: 91). Erik Olin 
Wright has also drawn attention to the fact that communities can foster ‘exclusionary 
solidarities’ as well as ‘universalistic ones’ (Wright, 2009: 267). The problem is often one 
of responsibility as the onus tends to be placed on individuals to integrate into the 
community rather than on the community to integrate individuals: responsibility is often 
‘a one-way street’ (Hudson, ibid.: 107). 
 Even more problematic is the fact that communities habitually divest themselves 
of responsibility altogether for individuals who they deem to be unworthy of citizenship. 
Offenders in particular are often cast out of the community, both physically – in prison – 
and symbolically – by loss of the basic rights of citizenship. This is illustrated by the loss 
of the right to vote. As Duff has explained, the law can no longer bind us as citizens, as it 
is no longer ‘the law of an “us” to which [offenders] unqualifiedly belong’: it becomes the 
law of a ‘we’ that they no longer form a part of (Duff, 2005: 213). Yet, the current Prime 
Minister regards stripping offenders of such essential civil rights as entirely normal. David 
Cameron, commenting on the issue following the European Court of Human Rights’ 
declaration that the UK’s current blanket ban on voting is incompatible with article 3 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, declared, ‘when people commit a crime and 
go to prison, they should lose their rights, including the right to vote’ (Cameron, 2010b). 
The exclusivity of communities is thus supported, and even encouraged, by the State, 
demonstrating the importance of moving beyond the State when developing real utopias, 
a point we shall return to below.  
Once communities exclude ‘undesirables’ from their midst, they are effectively 
exempt from further responsibility for them, despite the government rhetoric of 
community responsibilisation. Such deresponsibilisation is regarded as legitimate once 
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the community is accorded the status of victim. Indeed, as crime is always seen as being 
perpetrated against the community rather than being produced in and by the community, 
responsibility is seen to lie solely with offending individuals. This line of thinking helps to 
construct offenders as ‘Other’, as lying outside the moral community. As Zygmunt Bauman 
has so eloquently explained, once such social distance is created, undesirables can be 
dehumanised and ‘moral inhibition’ regarding their treatment suspended (1989: 25). 
Using the work of Helen Fein, he effectively demonstrates how they are placed outside the 
‘universe of obligation’, cast into a world were moral precepts do not bind. Punitive rather 
than welfarist responses to social harm are thus favoured.  
 
The failure of liberal penal policies 
Liberal penal polices have attempted to foster the development of more inclusive 
communities underpinned by the notion of responsibility. Communities have been 
encouraged to take more responsibility for dealing with harmful behaviour and 
reintegrating offenders whilst wrongdoers themselves have been encouraged to take 
more responsibility for their own actions. One of the most influential liberal penological 
approaches in this mould is the ‘responsibility and justice paradigm’ (Scott, 2001). 
Primarily influential in the 1990s and 2000s, this approach accepts the legitimacy of state 
punishments but advocates a new, more inclusive relationship between the prison and 
community (King and Morgan, 1980 ; Woolf, 1991). Prisons should be more like the 
community with ‘permeable walls’ and stronger ‘community ties’ (Woolf, 1991, para 
1.148). Prisons should also be normalised in the sense that basic living standards and legal 
protection ought to be the same for all citizens, whether they reside inside or outside 
prison. Yet even this liberal rhetoric can be misleading. The prisoner is to be treated with 
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‘respect’ only if they make responsible choices whilst inside (Woolf, 1991; Scott, 2001). 
Community responsibility to reintegrate offenders is only to be activated once offenders 
deem themselves worthy by demonstrating their own capacity to take responsibility. In 
recent times, the new conservative government has sought to get communities involved 
in the rehabilitation of prisoners. The Justice Secretary, Michael Gove, exhorted ordinary 
citizens to ‘help the hungry, the sick and the imprisoned’ by playing a role in prisoner 
rehabilitation (Gove, 2015) whilst the Prime Minister encouraged businesses to offer 
former prisoners a second chance by providing them with employment (Cameron, 2016). 
Prisoners themselves are to be responsibilised for their own rehabilitation, with 
privileges and earned release determined by participation in educational activity in 
particular (Gove, 2015). Yet, in continuity with other ‘liberal’ reforms, community 
responsibility is conditional and selective: only those wrongdoers who are considered 
responsible are deemed worthy of reintegration into the moral community. As Cameron 
put it, the aim is to find the ‘diamonds in the rough and [help] them shine’ (Cameron, 
2016). The ‘irredeemables’ can legitimately be kept apart from society, preferably behind 
bars.  
 The possibility of the moral inclusion of wrongdoers is thus generally predicated 
on a logic of exclusion. The current focus on the normalisation of prisons through 
education, as promoted by Gove, can be understood as playing a role in shaping 
hegemonic understandings of the most appropriate responses to ‘crime’ and social harm. 
However, imprisonment is profoundly unnatural. Without doubt, prisons are cruel, lonely 
and destructive places. Confinement within such painful, isolating and brutal institutions 
is compounded by the constant menace of systematic abuse, maltreatment and ultimately 
dehumanisation. Threats to dignity, self respect, personal safety and other pre-requisites 
of humanity seem endemic to the largely hidden world of the prison. The problem is that 
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current policies and initiatives aimed at reform and education are defined and defended 
on the terrain of the state. The prison aims to coerce offenders into being responsible 
citizens, ignoring the fact that prisons are hardly the appropriate environment for such 
purposes. There is an urgent requirement to develop non-penal real utopian 
interventions, grounded in non-state understandings and practices of responsibilities and 
justice, which may effectively responsibilise all citizens, whether they are offenders, 
victims or potential victims of crime. It is necessary to reimagine the very concept of 
citizenship on which inclusive communities may thrive. We propose a real utopian vision 
of citizenship based on responsibility and justice which we hope may invite non-penal 
real utopian interventions to deal with offending behaviour. Rather than embedding 
‘penal utopias’, it is hoped that these visions may open up possibilities for real non-penal 
utopian alternatives to the penal rationale. 
 
Towards a real utopian citizenship of the common  
Citizenship as real utopia 
Reimagining citizenship entails abandoning fatalism – the idea that only exclusionary 
responses are appropriate for problematic behaviour – in favour of a ‘considered 
utopianism’. Following Ernst Bloch, Pierre Bourdieu described this strategy as one 
whereby we ‘work collectively on analyses able to launch realistic projects and actions 
closely matched to the objective processes of the order they are meant to transform’ 
(Bourdieu, 1997: 128, authors’ emphasis). This idea fits closely with Wright’s notion of 
real utopia: ‘utopian ideals that are grounded in the real potentials of humanity, utopian 
destinations that have accessible waystations, utopian designs of institutions that can 
inform our practical tasks of navigating a world of imperfect conditions for social change’ 
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(Wright, 2009: 4). With regard to developing a more inclusive notion of citizenship on 
which non-penal real utopian solutions might be based, this entails delineating the 
actually existing principles which would inform such a notion and exploring the real 
potentialities of collective action. Non-penal real utopias are about thinking differently, 
visualising new possibilities and realities and facilitating transformative change (Scott, 
2013). They involve enhancing life and promoting human flourishing and showing that 
another world is possible (Wright, 2009). Yet, they must be feasible and desirable – they 
must be possible in our historical conjuncture and also meet the demands of justice – that 
is, be democratic, be rights-regarding and facilitate (or are at least be consistent with) an 
equitable distribution of the social product and the meeting of human need (Dussel, 
1985). 
 
Key principles for inclusive citizenship 
The first key principle which should inform an inclusive notion of citizenship is that of 
horizontality. Citizenship is commonly understood as a vertical relationship with the State 
whereby the latter determines the terms of that relationship in a top-down manner. 
Indeed, citizenship has been historically tied to the nation-state under whose authority 
associated rights and obligations are determined (Isin and Turner, 2002: 3). Although the 
State claims to delegate greater power to communities, it is essentially the State which 
determines which citizens should have access to which rights. Following John Hoffman, it 
is necessary to go beyond the State when thinking about citizenship since its monopoly 
on the ‘legitimate’ use of force means that those subject to force are necessarily prevented 
from exercising the rights and duties of citizenship (Hoffman, 2004). Furthermore, and 
this point is particularly relevant with regard to penal policy, ‘the use of force is inimical 
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to conflict resolution: only negotiation and arbitration can resolve conflicts of interest, 
since force crushes agency, and the agency of all the parties is essential if a dispute is to 
be successfully tackled’ (Hoffman, 2004: 173).  
 Agency is the second key principle which must underpin inclusive citizenship. As 
suggested above, agency is effectively denied in mainstream notions of citizenship as 
communities are divested of responsibility for ‘undesirable’ citizens. Those who are 
excluded from citizenship, whilst deemed responsible for their own exclusion, are also 
denied the opportunity to exercise agency in terms of determining how reparation can be 
made for harmful behaviour. As Hoffman underlines, the agency of all parties to a dispute 
is essential. This leads us to the third key principle supporting inclusive citizenship: the 
idea that citizenship should be plural, excluding no one.   This means including those on 
the margins and periphery of society as well as those in the centre. 
 Fourthly, all should be included on equal terms. As Nancy Fraser has explained, 
there must be ‘parity of participation’ based on ‘social arrangements that permit all 
(adult) members of society to interact with one another as peers’. The principle of equality 
is best upheld by affirming basic human rights, not limited to narrowly-defined, and often 
conditional, citizenship rights. We thus suggest that it is necessary to go beyond 
‘remarshalling citizenship’, as Robert Reiner advises (2010: 261), calling for a restoration 
of the political, social and civil rights of citizenship. Whilst this would certainly lead to a 
move inclusive notion of citizenship than that which currently exists, it is a version of 
citizenship which is understood primarily vis-à-vis the State rather than as solidaristic 





A citizenship of the common  
These key principles ought to underpin what we describe as ‘an inclusive citizenship of 
the common’, based on justice and responsibility. This idea finds its origins in 
commonism. Commonism is a form of socialism promoting communities of mutual care 
and support and the collective organisation of the relations of production so that it can 
meet human needs for all. The concept has a long tradition. It finds its origins in the ideas 
of early English socialists such as Gerrard Winstanley (1649/2010) whose writings and 
activism aimed to emancipate ‘common land’ for the people and liberate the ‘spirit of 
community’ and the French socialist tradition of ‘mutualism’ promoted by Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon2(2011). Yet, it is as a contemporary social movement by which it has recently 
attracted renewed attention (Dardot & Laval, 2014) expressed its aims to build non-
authoritarian partnerships and networks of cooperation and collaboration in everyday 
settings such as the workplace, family, and wider community (Shantz, 2013). 
Symbolically, commonism is a means of identifying our ‘common heritage’, recognising 
each person’s ‘common humanity’ and facilitating ‘meaningful participation in decision-
making processes around housing, work, education and food’ (Ibid: 11). Of central 
concern is the development of anti-capitalist real utopian practices in the here and now, 
but there is also interest in non-penal means of resolving conflicts and addressing social 
harms.  
    Commonism questions the legitimacy of authoritarian power, structural inequalities 
and institutionalised practices of domination, exploitation and dehumanisation. 
Commonism morally condemns coercion and violence in all their manifestations, 
promoting instead non-authoritarian ways of organising human life through free 
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agreements, voluntary associations and mutual reciprocation. Rather than cajole, control 
and destroy, commonism is life-affirming and promotes what Jun (2010:56) calls ‘vitality’: 
the point is to help people live. Commonism is radically egalitarian with a strong emphasis 
on ethical judgement, diversity, freedom, direct participation in decision-making and the 
democratisation of political representation. As a basic principle of human dignity, 
ordinary people should be able to speak for themselves and democratic procedures 
ensure that their voice is both heard and listened to (Scott, 2016a, 2016b). 
    For Dardot and Laval, ‘the common’ is not just about ideals or institutions, it is about 
social action and praxis. This is what gives the notion of ‘an inclusive citizenship of the 
common’ its real utopian dimension: it is utopian in the sense that it goes beyond what 
actually exists, beyond a mere reformist agenda, yet it is real to the extent that it can only 
exist as lived experience. Commonism must therefore emerge from the common actions 
of all citizens. Dardot and Laval (2014) imagine a ‘federation of commons’ that is not 
limited to the boundaries of a nation state but one which is plural and decentred, based 
not on formal rights granted by the State but instead on practice. It aims to be ‘popular’ 
without being ‘populist’, guided by commonly-held principles such as dignity, solidarity, 
equity and freedom. It is also emancipatory in the sense that it enables individuals to 
directly participate in bringing about social change. Indeed, emancipatory praxis occurs 
when an individual consistently acts directly in accordance with the normative values and 
principles of human liberation – that is integrating their broader ethical worldview within 
daily practice (Scott, 2016c). Fundamentally, this entails taking on responsibility to act in 
the common good.  
    Concretely, in terms of developing a citizenship of the common, commonism may 
encourage collective practices such as ‘associational democracy’ whereby collective 
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organisations come together to take decisions and directly influence the political process 
(Wright, 2009). This would certainly encourage an active, emancipatory politics of the 
common, provided that these organisations remain as porous as possible, avoiding an 
exclusive membership ethos. In the current neoliberal context in which many different 
states are facing the same problems of inequality and injustice caused by transnational 
corporate power networks, it is also necessary that these groups do not confine 
themselves to the nation state but join together across borders to seek common solutions. 
Associational approaches are particularly attractive, addressing as they do the problems 
of irresponsibility highlighted above by allowing citizens to take joint responsibility for 
social problems and engage in a common endeavour to institute new practices. 
Commonism thus directly challenges state power from below through everyday 
collective actions and praxis. Contra Proudhon, we cannot assume that these practices of 
the common will emerge naturally and spontaneously (Dardot & Laval, 227). It is 
necessary to think strategically about how to institute the common. In other words, the 
utopia of the common must be real. In the next section, we will attempt to show how 
constructing non-penal real utopias may be regarded as both emerging from and helping 
to construct a truly common notion of citizenship.  
 
Non-penal real utopias of the common 
Non-penal real utopianism should draw upon both a radical imagination that steps 
outside of the assumptions of the penal rationale and currently existing community-based 
interventions that engage with human troubles and problematic conduct. Exploring 
alternatives to exclusionary penal practices should be regarded as social action, as part of 
exercising citizenship as praxis. This entails reclaiming the issue from the State in order 
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to develop alternative forms of justice firmly rooted in inclusive communities: from 
stateless citizenship it may perhaps be possible to imagine forms of stateless justice, a 
genuine ‘justice of the common’.  
 
The dangers of community responses to social harm  
Moving beyond the State will entail citizens assuming real responsibility for the social 
problems that affect them, engaging in collaborative practices to address these in a 
meaningful way. It is not about communities getting involved in the existing institutions 
of the State, such as assuming a sense of ‘ownership’ of the prison (Faulkner, 2003: 306), 
but about communities being genuinely ‘active’ in developing inclusive, non-penal 
solutions. So far, attempts to resolve issues arising from harmful behaviour in the 
community context, notably restorative justice initiatives, have frequently been captured 
by the State (see, for example, Convery et al., 2008; Copson, this volume). Restorative 
justice, in placing the victim at the centre of analysis; providing a voice to all parties, 
including the voice of the offender; downplaying or removing coercive solutions; placing 
relationships at the heart of the response to a given problematic or troublesome act; 
focusing on positive and constructive outcomes and emphasising fixing, compensating, 
repairing or restoring balance, can certainly be deployed as a non-penal intervention. Yet, 
in practice, restorative justice is often punishment under a different name. Whatever the 
definition or benevolent intentions of practitioners, the application of pain infliction 
continues, but disturbingly now its reality is disguised (Scott, 2009). Restorative justice 
remains a vague and illusive concept. On a practical level, the concern is that the capitalist 
state is still given penal power, but that legal rights, safeguards and protections of 
wrongdoers are in effect removed, resulting in potentially heavier pain infliction than 
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through the penal law. Restorative and shaming interventions, whilst non-penal in nature, 
have been and are used in addition to existing penal responses. Non-custodial responses 
to wrongdoing must never follow the logic that there must be a strengthening of 
community punishments to appear politically plausible. Finally, they do nothing to 
address structural inequalities and imbalances in power. There is no consideration of the 
implications (or harms) of the inequitable distribution of social product or how life 
choices, including the perpetration of wrongs and harms, are shaped by structural 
contexts. This example of restorative justice demonstrates that there is no guarantee that 
the community response/ stateless justice will be free of domination and coercion, 
especially when applied in profoundly unjust contexts. Non-penal real utopian solutions 
to social harm must therefore seek above all to promote genuine justice and 
responsibility. 
 
Justice, responsibility and non-penal utopias 
In his work on mutualism, Proudhon addressed the issue of justice and social harm 
(1989). He grounded his notions of justice in respect, inherent dignity and guaranteed 
mutually reciprocating relations. Citizens had a duty to protect the dignity of their 
neighbour and ensure that there was ‘natural harmony’. However, Proudhon also 
recognised that conflict and troubles would be inevitable. Proudhon, himself imprisoned 
for three years where he experienced solitary confinement and ‘forced relationality’ and 
where his health was, in the long term, broken, was a penal abolitionist. For him, no 
authority had the right to punish: punishment has nothing to do with justice, only with 
‘iniquitous and atrocious vengeance’. He was against penal servitude and argued that 
punishment was symbolic of the moral problems regarding inequality and injustice. 
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Justice required that conflicts be handled through non-violent methods, such as 
reparations. There was for Proudhon a need to replace penal discipline with the morality 
of justice (Hyman, 1979). 
 Yet, Proudhon’s vision of justice is limited to the extent that it fails to focus on the 
wider context in which injustice may occur. Enrique Dussel (2013:413), on the other 
hand, though his vision of ‘liberation praxis’, demonstrates how we might broaden this 
focus by showing us how exactly justice may replace penal discipline. Central to the 
liberation praxis of Dussel (2013) is the ‘paradigm of life’. Without ensuring that there are 
appropriate material conditions, there can be no justice. Both his understanding of 
responsibilities and justice are predicated on ‘an ethics of life’ (Dussel, 2013:108), a 
‘community of living beings’ where the ‘ethical duty [is] to reproduce and develop the life 
of the human subject’ (ibid: 217). For Dussel, there is an ethical responsibility to ensure 
that those who are in an ‘asymmetrical’ position to us – that is they have less power and 
resources than we do – are treated with dignity and that their basic needs are met. Such a 
responsibility does not have to be demanded by another person, but rather arises 
automatically through appearance of ‘the face’, through an encounter with, or knowledge 
of, a weaker person we are compelled to abandon reciprocity and undertake non-
reciprocal acts of hospitality. Praxis ‘is this and nothing more’ (Dussel, 1985:170): praxis 
is to make the stranger, the lost, the outcast and begotten part of our moral universe and 
to actively respond in aid of their plight.  
    Dussel (2013:207) refers to such people, who are excluded, marginalised denied 
dignity and ‘affected by a situation akin to death’ as ‘victims’. Liberation praxis entails not 
only recognising that such victims of social injustice are ethical subjects who have 
legitimate demands upon us in terms of meeting their needs but also ensuring that their 
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voice is heard (Scott, 2016b). Victims are often silenced or their voice cannot be heard 
and liberation praxis demands that we challenge the validity of such denials from the 
perspective of the victim themselves. This means listening and learning to learn from 
victims. Whilst there is ‘no single voice of all human kind’ and to be treated the same is 
not equivalent to being treated equally, we must recognise the fluidity and contingency of 
categorisations; demonstrate a willingness to pay attention to the voices of ‘concrete 
others’; and acknowledge that each voice comes from a specifically situated position, 
standpoint or worldview rather than a generalised and abstract universalism (Hudson, 
2003; Scott, 2016a). Equality will be ‘complex’ (i.e. equity) but we must somehow find a 
way in which it can encompass the diversity of human subjectivities. For real justice there 
is a need for reflexivity and the promotion of freedom and autonomy; to hear different 
voices; and reconstruct a notion of universality that is sensitive to social contexts 
(Hudson, 2003).   
    A crucial analytical and normative innovation of liberation praxis is to view the 
world from the ‘exterior’ – to look at the world from the outside through the eyes of the 
marginalised and excluded victim (Scott, 2106a).  The engagement with community then 
is through an external lens. Liberation praxis looks at life from its negation (Dussel, 2008). 
Ethical responsibility and principles of justice are based on the experiences of those on 
the outside of the system: the Other. More than this, Dussel (2008) develops a clear set of 
normative political principles upon which community values and attitudes can be 
externally evaluated. The ‘formal principle’ allows procedural safeguards ensuring the 
promotion of the voice of all people (including ‘victims’) so that a community is genuinely 
based on participatory democracy. The ‘material principle’, as detailed above, notes that 
the social organisation of any society must be grounded in principles of distributive and 
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social justice. Finally, the ‘feasibility principle’ looks to promote and foster the most 
appropriate ways of delivering justice in the here and now.   
The key question is not simply ‘is this just?’ but also ‘who is granted justice and to 
whom is justice denied’ (Hudson, 2003)? Those who most lacked justice (and indeed also 
security) are the poor, powerless and disadvantaged. Too often their sufferings are 
neglected or marginalised; too often their voice de-legitimated; and too often their claims 
to equal respect denied. For Dussel (1985:65) liberation praxis should result in ‘liberative 
justice’:    
Liberative justice, which does not give to each what is due within the law 
and the prevailing order, but grants to all what they deserve in their dignity 
as others. Thus liberative justice is not legal justice, whether distributive or 
communicative, but real justice – that is, subversive: subverting the 
established unjust order.  (Ibid) 
 
An ethics of justice requires acknowledgement and respect towards people not like us. 
Hudson (2003) refers to this as ‘justice as alterity’ and it has significant connections to 
Dussel’s (1985) liberative justice: 
Justice involves recognition of the likeness in the sense of shared 
humanness, but not insistence on reduction or elimination of differences, 
rather the respecting of differences.  (Hudson 2003:190) 
Justice as alterity demands that we meet the other without violence and this approach in 
effect translates into love of the other. In terms of slogans, whilst equality, liberty and 
fraternity still pertain we could perhaps articulate them today in terms of recognition and 
respect for irreducible differences; freedom from dominance and oppression of the 
majority; and solidarity with, and responsibility for, sufferers. Like Dussel (2013), critical 
scholars such as Barbara Hudson (2003) have also argued that our responsibilities to 
other humans stretch way beyond our close family, friends and community to also include 
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the ‘stranger’, ‘outcast’ and others not known to us directly or sharing similar 
characteristics or social backgrounds. We must learn to accept differences, acknowledge 
the existence of the stranger / ‘victim’, but also to recognise what we share – common 
humanity. It is important that rather than focusing on the ‘enemies within’, we should look 
to find new suitable friends (Scott, 2013):   
Far too often, in the real rather than the theoretical world, the response to 
the presence of the stranger – the application for entry, the beggar, the 
disorderly and disreputable – is to confine them, to segregate them, or to 
exclude them altogether.  Prisons, detention centres, ghettoes and gated 
estates demonstrate the refusal of hospitality and the desire to avoid 
encounters with strangers, rather than to respond to their claims and 
needs.  (Hudson, 2011:120) 
 Drawing on the insights of Hudson (2011) and Dussel (2013), Scott (2016a) has 
argued that liberative praxis leads us down an emancipatory path that intimately 
connects debates around justice and responsibilities with the promotion of human rights. 
From an abolitionist perspective, Scott (2016a) argues that such a human rights agenda 
will always be ‘unfinished’ for it must be forged through emancipatory struggle and acts 
of defiance. An ‘aboltionist human rights agenda’ from below will continuously evolve and 
should be focussed on making more visible the institutionally-structured violence of 
incarceration alongside broader structural inequalities that blight human life. Such 
abolitionist critiques must aim to reveal the ideological closure of the existing foundations 
of legal rights and reignite their more emancipatory potential. Abolitionist human rights 
agendas therefore move beyond a merely humanitarian approach reflecting the content 
of international covenants and grounded in the amelioration of suffering. Thiers is an 
agenda that reflects the liberation struggles of the powerless and contributes towards 
emancipatory and transformative praxis. Consequently, for Scott (2016a) the aspiration 
of those struggling for justice and human rights must be for freedom from domination and 
the removal of the causes of human suffering.  
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  For abolitionists such as Hudson (2003, 2011) and Scott (2016a) human rights 
must reflect our responsibilities for the Other rather than for the self. To protect human 
rights, society must learn to hear and learn to learn from the voice of the estranged Other, 
recognise their inherent dignity, and meet them with non-violence (Scott, 2016b). Radical 
alternatives should be historically immanent, in place of an existing sanction and not be 
grounded in authoritarian forms of domination (Scott, 2013). Non-penal interventions 
must reflect the normative frameworks of human rights, democratic accountability and 
social justice (Scott, 2013, 2016c). In this sense, the ‘abolitionist real utopia’ (see Scott and 
Bell, this volume) perspective maps directly onto the concerns of those of Wright (2010) 
and Dussel (2013).  
For Dussel (2013), liberative justice is not just about creating freedom for victims, 
but also responsibility for the social, economic and political transformation of the 
conditions and structures which create victimhood in the first instance. In an argument 
reminiscent of that found in commonism, the aim of the praxis of liberation is to create 
symmetrical relationships resulting in mutual aid and responsibility. There is an ‘ethical 
obligation of “transforming” the reality that produced victims’ (Dussel, 2013:288) and the 
creation of a new ‘mutual responsibility’ (Ibid: 281).  
The excluded should not be merely included in the old system – as this 
would be to introduce the Other into the Same – but rather ought to 
participate as equals in a new institutional moment … This is a struggle not 
for inclusion, but for transformation. (Dussel, 2008: 89, emphasis in the 
original) 
Transformation must entail direct engagement with the ‘victim’. For the purposes 
of non-penal utopian justice, the victim here must be understood widely to include all 
victims of social injustice, whether they have broken the law and caused harm or not. The 
encounter with the victim, for Dussel (2013: 352) is the ‘possible utopia’. We must work, 
day-in-day-out with the people of the ‘present utopia: the peripheral peoples, the 
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oppressed classes’ (Dussel, 1985:48) Emancipatory politics and praxis must then exercise 
an ‘ethical-utopian reason’ (Dussel, 2013:223) and draw upon the ‘feasibility’ principle to 
build upon interventions that are real and viable in our historical moment. 
 
Unleashing transformative justice 
We therefore have a responsibility when developing non-penal responses to social harm 
to work in common with all those affected in a common endeavour to develop a just 
response in opposition to the often unjust responses of the State. It is an opportunity to 
create a counter-revolution in response to these exclusionary responses by proposing a 
new non-penal rationality that is genuinely transformative. A citizenship of the common, 
and for an emancipatory politics and praxis, ought therefore to favour transformative 
justice. Ruth Morris (2000:3) describes transformative justice as such: 
Transformative justice uses the power unleashed by the harm of crime to 
let those most affected find truly creative, healing solutions. Transformative 
justice includes victims, offenders and their families, and their 
communities, and invites them to use the past to dream of a better future … 
Transformative justice recognises the wrongs of all victims, and recognises 
also that sooner or later, we are all both victims and offenders. 
Transformative justice means handling conflicts and troubles by listening, 
acknowledging the victim’s injury and hurt and finding ways that can lead to healing and 
just settlements for all. Transformative justice is victim-focused, but it recognises equally 
the victims of problematic and troublesome interpersonal harms and the ‘victim’ (Dussel, 
2013) of the harms generated by ‘distributive’ and social injustices, multi-national 
corporations and state domination (Morris, 2000: 5). The focus is justice and the 
transformation of context and situations characterised by injustice and the facilitation of 
more caring, cooperative and inclusive communities. Only transformative social justice 
can lead to transformative non-penal justice: transformative justice is impossible in 
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unjust contexts. Justice means responding to harms in a non-violent manner and trying to 
‘correct mistakes’ (Dussel, 2008). 
This goal of social transformation leads to an emphasis on finding answers, 
recognising wrong done, providing safety and security, providing an appropriate form of 
redress and helping the victim find new meanings and understandings (Morris, 2000). 
But it also means meeting needs – housing, relational, therapeutic – and reaffirming life. 
Transformative justice is about restoring ‘world’ for victims, providing them with voice 
and helping to create or rebuild ‘vitality’ – the paradigm of life (Dussel, 2013). The struggle 
for transformative justice is at the heart of our daily lives – interventions, direct action, 
writing, speaking, engaging with people about the issues that matter – living a life that 
connects with our principles and responsibility for Others: emancipatory politics and 
praxis.  
 
Conclusion: commonism, real utopias and transformative justice 
In neoliberal societies, individualism and competition constantly undermine the 
‘common’ as the ties that bind us become weakened. As society becomes increasingly 
atomised, collective participation in social, institutional and political structures is limited, 
allowing power to become ever-more concentrated at the top. In a context of 
‘decollectivisation’ and profound social inequality (Dardot & Laval, 2014: 15), attempts to 
reinvigorate communities have been unsuccessful. The discourse of individual 
responsibilisation has paradoxically justified the irresponsibility of communities with 
regard to individuals who are thought to have failed in their duties to the community. 
Once deresponsibilised in this way, communities have allowed the State to exercise its 
repressive power with regard to those who are deemed unworthy of citizenship.  
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 A reimagined citizenship of the common offers a possibility to citizens to become 
genuinely active in imagining alternative social structures. Faced with the significant 
hegemonic power of the neoliberal model, such a concept of citizenship is unlikely to 
emerge spontaneously. Conscious efforts need to be made to get citizens involved in 
common projects to radically reimagine the way that society is currently ordered, thus 
fostering mutual responsibility. Dussel’s concept of ‘liberation praxis’ allows us to imagine 
how we may assume responsibility for developing a just social order. It suggests that 
citizen action needs to be transformative, capable of overturning hegemonic rationalities 
of all kinds. In that sense, it is utopian, but it is also real, grounded in the praxis of 
collective action. It is through working collectively to develop common responses to social 
problems such as crime that the notion of a citizenship of the common can go beyond the 
ideal to become a practical, transformative reality, capable of generating non-penal 
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